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ABSTMCT
 
Multinational corporations (MNC) have recently
 
been pushed to the forefront of the analyses of world
 
economic development. This study attempts to provide
 
a sketch of the future role of multinational corpora
 
tions in the development process of host countries
 
by synthesizing existing views of MNC activity. The
 
various schools of thought are discussed and a step
 
towards a systematic reconciliation of theoretical
 
differences is attempted. Finally, the impact of
 
multinational corporations on Turkey's development proc
 
ess is considered with specific attention paid to the
 
issues of balance of payments, taxes, transfer of tech
 
nology and employment.
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Chapter 1
 
INTRODUCTION
 
In the past few decades the multinational corp
 
oration (MNC), a major force in the economic world, has
 
been pushed to the forefront of the analyses of world
 
economic development. This attention to the roles of the
 
MNC was generated from the concerns expressed by developing
 
countries in their attempts to implement social, political
 
and economic transformations. Broadly speaking, those
 
critical of MNCs accuse them of hindering the development of
 
local economies through the advancement of inappropriate
 
production and constmiption patterns, and of interference in
 
domestic affairs. On the other hand, proponents of MNCs
 
assert that foreign direct investment (FDI) via the multi
 
national corporation benefits the host countries by provid
 
ing the tools to develop their economies and raise the
 
standard of living. Above all it represents the path of
 
salvation for the development of Third World economies
 
which are lacking in capital and/or expertise.
 
In support of these opposing views, several concep
 
tual frameworks of analyses have been forwarded. In addi
 
tion to the classical, the most widely held frameworks include:
 
Neo-Marxist, Neo-Mercantilist, Sovereignty-at-Bay,
 
and Global Reach approaches. Briefly, while th^ Neo-

Glassical model sees the multinational corporations as a
 
means of enhancing world welfare, the Neo-Marxists view
 
MNCs as benefiting the parent company to the detriment of
 
the host country. The Sovereignty-at-Bay model views MNCs
 
as potential contributors to the home and host country, and
 
as independent of the home state. The Neo-Mercantilists
 
posit that MNCs have a positive impact on the home country
 
and a beneficial impact on the host country. In addition,
 
MNCs are viewed as responsive to US interests. Finally,
 
the Global Reach school holds that MNCs are a detriment to
 
global welfare as they are merely concerned with their
 
selfish interests.
 
This study is the result of the dissatis'faction
 
with the application of any one approach to a particular
 
country. The above mentioned approaches are far too general
 
to be accurately applied across the board. They tend to
 
overlook a country's specific needs as well as its singular
 
cultural and historical values. To consider the impact of
 
multinational corporations as either beneficial or detri
 
mental to a country, from a holistic point of view, appears
 
to be a simplification of a complex and dynamic issue. This
 
study is an attempt to provide a sketch of the potential
 
role of multinational corporations in the development
 
process by using an analysis which consists of a synthesis
 
of the above mentioned approaches. It provides an analyt­
ical framework within which lesser developed countries
 
(LDCs) relations with MNCs can be analyzed in relation to
 
recent developments in international financial markets.
 
This study will also look at the impact that MNCs
 
have had on the economic development of Turkey, as well as
 
their future role in that country, Turkey was chosen for
 
the case study as its new economic policies are encouraging
 
foreign investments. In the past, Turkey had shown a
 
certain coolness towards FDI. In this respect Turkey rep
 
resents a valuable country for the analysis of MNC-LDC
 
relations.
 
Objectives and Methodology
 
The purpose of this study is twofold: (1) to de
 
velop an eclectic synthesis of the various models which
 
attempt to examine the impact of multinational corpo
 
rations on host countries; and (2) to use the Turkish case
 
to examine the past and potential role that MNCs have
 
played in the Turkish economy. Such issues as balance of
 
payments, government revenue, employment, and transfer of
 
technology will be analyzed. Growth and development
 
statistics along with a review of the current literature
 
will be examined in this attempt.
 
The Plan of Future Chapters
 
In addition to this chapter, five subsequent
 
chapters will be presented. The second chapter will provide
 
the review of literature on the various models of analyses
 
6f multinational corporations. The third chapter will
 
present the objectives, the methodology, as well as the
 
limitations intrinsic to this study. The fourth chapter
 
will consist of an alternative approach to the analysis of
 
multinational corporations, and will be followed by a survey
 
on the impact of foreign direct investment on the develop
 
ment of Turkey, which comprises the fifth chapter. The
 
sixth chapter will consist of the stimmary and the con
 
clusions of this study.
 
Chapter 2
 
A REVIEW OF THE VARIOUS APPROACHES
 
TO THE ANALYSIS OF MNCs
 
This chapter presents a brief review of the
 
literature on the various approaches to the analysis of
 
multinational corporations. Since much has already been
 
written on the various models, the review is merely in
 
tended to familiarize the reader with the main charac
 
teristics expounded by the various schools, and does not
 
contend to present a complete presentation of the schools.
 
The Neo-Classical School
 
Despite the apprehensions expressed by host states
 
with regard to the multinational corporations, the neo
 
classical school holds that the continued attempts on the
 
part of the host states to attract foreign direct invest
 
ment through various incentive packages, such as prefer
 
ential tax legislations, suggests that the benefits of
 
FDI outweigh the negative effects that may arise. Ac
 
cording to this school, multinational corporations are
 
an asset to the host country's quest for economic develop
 
ment by providing scarce capital, technological and mana
 
gerial skills,employment, and by aiding the baLance of
 
payments. In addition, the orientation of the multi-^
 
national corporation towards efficiency and cost reduc
 
tion adds to its potential as an effective agent of
 
development.^
 
It is generally held that developing countries often
 
lack the necessary capital for the development of key in
 
dustries. According to Blake and Walters "One of the more
 
important benefits of multinational corporations for host
 
countries is the mobilization and productive use of in
 
vestment capital.^
 
Traditional theorists generally tend to point to
 
a direct correlation between the flow of private foreign
 
investment and the economic progress of post World War II
 
Western Europe. The recent successes of Third World
 
countries such as Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea are also
 
used as supports to this argument. 3 This point is illus-

See for instance, Melville J. Ulmer, "Multi
 
national Corporations and Third World Development", Journal
 
of Economic Issues 14, no. 2 (June 1980); Nasrollah S.
 
Fatemi, Gail W. Williams, and Tribaut de Saint-Phalle,
 
Multinational Corporations; Problems and Prospects, 2nd ed.
 
(London: S. Barnes & Co., 1976) " ~
 
^David H. Blake and Robert S. Walters, The Politics
 
of Global Economic Relations (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
 
1976), p. 98; Ulmer estimates that U.S. direct investment in
 
the less developed countries at the end of 1978 neared $40
 
billion, and further estimated that it was growing by about
 
15 percent per annum.
 
'3
 
See for instance. Jack N. Behrman, National Interests
 
and the Multinational Enterprises (New Jersey: Prentice-

Hall, 1970), pp. 14-16; Ulmer (1980); Grant Reuber, Private
 
Foreign Investment in Development (Oxford: Clarendon
 
Press, 1973), p.
 
trated by 	the following chart;
 
Table 1. 	Growth rate and U.S. Direct Investment in
 
57 Third World Countries.
 
Countries Annual Average Change U.S. Direct In-
in CNP/capita 1960­ vestment per cap 
1976 (in percent) ita, 31 Dec. 1976 
Top one-third 4.57	 $45.78
 
Second Third 2.22	 13.97
 
Lowest third .22	 3.36
 
Source: Ulmer p.459. Per capita rates of growth are
 
taken from 1978 World Bank Atlas (Washington,
 
D.C.: World Bank 1979); U.S. direct investment
 
figures are from U.S. Department of Commerce,
 
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
 
As can be 	seen, this table seems to uphold the Neo
 
classical 	position. There does appear to be a correlation
 
between the amount of foreign investment and increases in
 
the growth rate of the Cross National Product (CNP). For
 
instance, those countries that have received an average of
 
$45.78 per capita in foreign investment have experienced
 
an average growth rate in the CNP of 4.57 percent. The
 
question that remains unanswered, however, is whether it
 
is the influx of FDI which has generated the higher growths,
 
or whether greater amounts of foreign investments were
 
attracted by existing high growth rates. As such, a simple
 
comparison of FDI/capita and per capita growth rates, remain
 
far from conelusive.
 
Another area in which the MNC is seen as con­
tributing factor to economic development involves the
 
transfer of technology and managerial skills, Through the
 
multinational corporation, the LDCs are able to enjoy the
 
technology developed by the investing countries, In add­
ition, the managerial skills that accompany foreign direct
 
investment increase the efficiency and reduce excessive
 
waste. Furthermore, the multinational corporatio:n devel­
ops and trains the management of host countries This is
 
done by sending the potential managers for training to an
 
affiliate or to the parent company.^
 
The Neo-Classical school further holds th t the
 
host country is attracted to the multinational ecrpora­
tions because of the employment that is generated by foreign
 
investment. Not only does it directly employ part of the
 
vast labor force, but it also creates jobs in re]ated in­
dustries by increasing the demand for goods supplied by
 
local enterprises. Traditional theorists hold tbat the
 
MNCs impace on employment has most likely been c uite
 
substantial from the standpoint of the areas in which it is
 
located. That is, Itt^Cs have proven to be more responsive to
 
host government incentives to locate in economlcally de­
^Behrman (1970) p.18.
 
pressed areas than the local corporations.
 
Another attractive aspect of foreign direct invest­
tnent is the favorable effect that MNCs have on the host
 
country's balance of payment accounts. Their contributions
 
to the balance of pajravent are seen as brought about by the
 
promotion of exports, and by the local productior of previ­
ously imported goods. Studies have shown that foreign sub­
sidiaries have proven to be more effective in exporting
 
their products, especially manufactured goods, than their
 
domestic counterparts,^
 
The view that Neo-Glassical theorists generally
 
have towards MNCs is best summarized in the writings of
 
Fairleight S, Dickinson Jr,:
 
The multinational corporations have definitely
 
contributed to world welfare. They have been
 
partly responsible for the rebuilding of war-

ravaged Europe and the development of resources
 
of many developing nations, Their ability to
 
tap financial, physical, and human resources
 
all over the world, their capacity to develop
 
new technology and skills, and their managerial
 
supremacy to translate resources into specific
 
outputs have proven to be outstending.7
 
In essence then, what this school advances is that a
 
free and open economy and the pursuit of self-interest in
 
5see Reuber (1973) pp.167-177; Behrman (1970)
 
pp.19-20.
 
^Blakd and Walters (1976) p.99,
 
7Fatemi, et.al, (1976) p.13 in the introduction by
 
Dickinson Jr.
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a competitive economy will have long run benefits through
 
the efficient utilization of resources.
 
The Neo-Marxist Approach
 
This approach finds its roots in the writings of
 
Marx, Hilferding, Lenin, and Liixemburg.^ This school
 
stresses two points. First, based on the Marxian theory
 
that the falling rate of profit will prove to be the nemesis
 
of the capitalist system, this approach sees the expan
 
sionary policies of the capitalist state as necessary for
 
its survival. Second, and closely related to the first, is
 
the view that the survival is accomplished at the expense of
 
the Third World.^
 
This school holds that the state is an agent of the
 
multinational corporations, and that the MNCs generate and
 
maintain patterns of inequality and dependency between
 
countries. By this argument the U.S. national interest is
 
seen as synonymous with that of American business groups.
 
In support of this argument, radical scholars often
 
SRudolph Hilferding, Das Finanzkapital (1910); V.I.
 
Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (N.Y.
 
International Publications, 1939); Rosa Luxemburg, The
 
Accumulation of Capital (London: Routledge, 1951).
 
^For a discussion on this see Griffin "Underdevel
 
opment in History" and Andre Gunder Frank "The Develop
 
ment of Underdevelopment". Both articles are in Charles
 
Wilber, ed., The Political Economy of Development and
 
Underdevelopment (Random House. 1979).
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point to the April 27, 1898 speech by Indiana's senator
 
J. Beveridge in which he states:
 
American factories are making more than the
 
American people can use. American soil is
 
producing more than they can consume. Fate
 
has written our policy for us; the trade of
 
the world must and shall be ours. And we
 
shall get it as our mother, England, has told
 
us how. We will establish trading posts through
 
out the world as distributing posts for
 
,	 American products. We will cover the ocean
 
with our merchant marine. We will build a
 
navy to the measures of our greatness. Great
 
colonies, governing themselves, flying our
 
flag and trading with us, will grow about our
 
posts of trade. Our institutions will follow
 
our trade on the wings of our commerce.10
 
Accepting as axiomatic the penetration of foreign
 
markets by big firms, the analysis of MNCs focuses on their
 
effects on local economies. Basically, advocates of this
 
approach see the underdevelopment of the Third World as an
 
epiphenomenon of the exploitative nature of the developed
 
capitalist world. The Neo-Marxists reject the claim of
 
corporate apologists and traditional theorists that foreign
 
investment benefits the host country as it provides capital,
 
technology, employment, and helps the balance of payments.
 
This school argues that rather than providing capital, multi'
 
national corporations avail themselves of local capital.
 
Felix Greene, The Enemy, Notes on Imperialism and
 
Revolution (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970 reprint ed,,
 
Philippines: Malaya Books Inc.), p.100. For further
 
interest see William A, William "The Large Corporation
 
and American Foreign Policy" in D. Horowitz, ed. Corp­
oratiohs and the Cold War (1969), p.74.
 
12 
For instance, 0'Connor has found overwhelming evidence
 
that "one-half of American and Foreign Power Company's
 
million post war expansion program...was financed from local
 
savings.
 
The claim that MNCs help the local economy and the
 
balance of pajnnent accounts is also refuted by the Neo-

Marxists who point to the repatriation of the majority of
 
the profits which were generated by local savings. In his
 
studies, Evans has found that during the period 1950-1965
 
MNCs' remittances from Latin America "Exceeded net new
 
private investment by $7,5 billion,
 
In addition to the repatriated profits, many LDCs
 
complain that the flight of capital is further increased by
 
the over-pricing of intermediate goods from the parent
 
company as well as by the over-charging for dated technology.
 
The Neo-Marxists also negate the claim that foreign invest
 
ment creates employment on the basis that MNCs tend to use
 
capital intensive technology.
 
This issue is further compounded by the fact that
 
hopeful laborers flood the industrial centers, from the
 
lljames 0'Connor,"The Meaning of Economic Imperi
 
alism", eds. Fann and Hodges, Readings in II,S, Imperi
 
alism (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1971)
 
12peter Evans, "National Autonomy and Economic Devel
 
opment: A Critical Perspective on Multinational Corpora
 
tions in Poor Countries" International Organization 25
 
(1971): 678.
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agricultural setting, hoping to find employment. This
 
influx of laborers creates slums and increases the level
 
of unemployment and ixnderemployment—thereby increasing the
 
reserve army of laborers and depressing wages.
 
On a greater scale, one of the main concerns of
 
radical scholars is the domination of a less developed
 
country's economy by the MNC: this is seen as reinforcing
 
the dependence of the LDC on the developed countries.
 
According to Sunkel, foreign firms in Latin America have
 
come to dominate the main sectors of private economic
 
activity causing a basic change in the social structure and
 
in the political system of those countries. On the same
 
issue Furtado points out:
 
The process of forming a local entrepreneur
 
ial class has been interrupted. The best
 
talents that emerge from local industries
 
are being absorbed into the new managerial
 
class...National independent entrepreneur­
ship is... restricted to secondary activities
 
or to pioneering ventures which in the long
 
run, simply open up new fields for the future
 
expansion of the multinational corporation,..
 
The elimination of the national entrepreneur
 
ial class necessarily excludes the possibility
 
of self-sustained national development, along
 
the lines of the classical capitalist
 
development.
 
While Neo-Classical scholars hold that the Third
 
130swalso Sunkel, "Big Business and Dependencia" in
 
G.,Modelski ed., Transnational Corporations and World
 
Order (1979),p.223.
 
l^Ibid., p.222 as quoted by Sunkel.
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World is underdeveloped because of lacking capital and
 
technological expertise, radical schola|rs such as Griffin
 
■ i 
posit that underdevelopment is a product of the historical
 
i
 
process of expansionism of the colonical powers,
 
An additional problem of foreign investment that
 
' • i
 
radical scholars point to is the creatipn of a dual eco­
■ ■ I ■ 
nomy in the host country. That is, while the center of the 
host state may prosper, the country as |a whole does not
 
. i
 
benefit proportionally, One of the leading scholars, Raul
 
Prebish, argues that the capitalist nations and the elites
 
■ j ' 
of the host country have formed an alliance geared towards
 
promoting consumer capitalism in the periphery,16
 
Neo-Mercantilism :
 
'j
 
Like the Neo-Marxist approach, the Neo-Mercant
 
ilists dismiss the impact of pluralist politics in ana­
i
 
lyzing the pursuit of national policies. In contrast to
 
the Neo-Marxists, this school considers the nation-state,
 
I
 
rather than the capitalist class, as the unitary actor in
 
l^Griffin in Wilber (1979), p.78. !
 
■ . j 
16For discussions on uneven development see Andre
 
Gunder Frank in Wilber (1979); Samir Amin, Accumulation
 
on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory^f Under­
development (N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1974); Johan
 
Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism" in G. Modelski
 
(1979); Raul Prebish, "A Critique of Peripheral Capitalism"
 
CEPAL Review (First Semester, 1976). |
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j ■ . . 
the role of policy making. In their view, the expan
 
sionary policies of American businesses can only be under
 
stood by an analysis of the international political order.
 
That is, multinational corporations are used by the U.S.
 
govemment in the quest of bringing host countries within
 
their sphere of influence in an era of competition with the
 
Soviet Union. The national strength vis-a-vis other states
 
is seen as the ultimate goal of policy makers, with economic
 
consideration occupying secondary concerns. This view is 
clearly stated by Gilpin: 
/ . ■ ■ 
...every economic system rests on a particular
 
political order, its nature cannot be under
 
stood aside from politics...The multinational
 
corporation has prospered because it has been
 
dependent on the power of, and been consistent
 
with the political interests of the United
 
States.17
 
Accordingly then,the MNC is a transnational actor for the
 
mere reason that it mirrors the perceived interests of the
 
United States. For instance, this school would argue that
 
the United States encouraged the overseas expansion of
 
extractive industries, for example, as a result of the
 
existing fear, voiced by Clark Clifford and James Forrestal,
 
that the United States was running out of raw materials.
 
Consequently, it follows that foreign investors will prove
 
to be more responsive to the needs and interests of the
 
17Robert Gi1pin, U.S. Power and the Multinational
 
Corporation (Basic Books, 1975), pp.40-41. ~
 
16 
home country. Unlike the Meo-Marxists, the Neo-Mer­
cantilists tend to concentrate their research on data
 
gathered from the developed states, namely Japan, West
 
Germany, France, and Great Britain, rather than on the
 
relationships that exist between multinational corpora
 
tions and less developed countries.
 
This school is heavily influenced by world politics
 
as well as by Neo-Classical economics. As stated by
 
Petras: "The politics of international development is
 
approached as the resolution of conflicts of interest among
 
national public policies,"18
 
Sovereignty-at-Bay
 
This school advances a transnational political
 
economy. It posits that the nation-state is gradually
 
decreasing in importance as the interdependence in the world
 
economy increases.19 As such, the nation-state can no longer
 
remain the sole focus of analysis and room must be made to
 
incorporate transnational actors, such as multinational
 
corporations in the overall analysis, By this approach, the
 
ISjames Petras and Kent Trachte, "Liberal, Struc
 
tural, and Radical Approaches to Political Economy: An
 
Assessment and an Alternative" in James Petras ed., Crit­
itcal Perspectives on Imperialism and Social Class in the
 
Third World (N.Y,: Monthly Review Press, 1978), p.18, ~
 
19see Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty-at-Bay (N.Y.:
 
Basic Books, 1971).
 
17 
multinational corporations are no longer seen as agents of
 
the nation-state or the capitalist class of its home country,
 
but rather as independent entities in the pursuit of their
 
self-interests. According to the Sovereignty-at-lay school
 
the increased competition faced by MNCs, has compelled them
 
to become anational and apolitical in the pursuit of their
 
corporate interests. Vernon also forwards that the increase
 
in new enterprises emerging to challenge the established
 
MNCs, will increase the bargaining power of the host states.
 
The forsaking of home country interests and the
 
increase in competition will lead, according to this school,
 
towards maximizing global welfare. This approach does not,
 
however, claim that the development of global welfare will
 
take place without any conflict, but rather will be a dia
 
lectic between several forces. Namely, the quest of host
 
government to increase their control over the domestic
 
economy; the increase in competition; and the MNCs pursuit
 
of profits. In regard to the domestic disparities advo
 
cated by the Neo-Marxist theorists to be the result of
 
foreign investment, Vernon states;
 
Nonetheless, a study that focuses on the multi
 
national enterprise proves a poor vehicle for
 
analyzing these fundamental issues. Multi­
national enterprises are neither the necessary
 
nor the sufficient condition for the existence
 
of the problems that are proving so deeply
 
troublesome in the industrializing process,
 
Hegemony, corruption, inequity, pollution,
 
and indifference to consumer interests were
 
endemic long before the multinational enter­
18
 
prise existed.20
 
Global Reach
 
This approach was developed by Richard Bamet and
 
Ronald Muller.^l While it concurs with the Sovereignty-at-

Bay approach in that multinational corporations are becom
 
ing anational entities, it disagrees with the approach that
 
MNCs are capable of promoting global welfare. Rather, Bamet
 
and Muller argue that MNCs operate to the detriment of both
 
home and host countries. The authors accuse the multi
 
national corporation of creating unemployment in both the
 
LDCs and the home countries and of depleting host conntry
 
resources without just compensation. In short, it can be
 
seen that this approach is very critical of the functions of
 
foreign direct investment. According to Bamet and Muller
 
multinational corporations "act as disturbers of the peace
 
on a global scale,"22
 
Summary and Conclusions
 
As can be seen by the literature review, there exists
 
20Raymond Vemon, "The Multinational Enterprise as
 
ol" Worldview (May 1977): 42,
 
^^Richard Bamet and Ronald Muller, Clobal Reach
 
.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1974),
 
22lbid., p,367.
 
19 
a vast array on the conclusions on the impact of multi
 
national corporations. While the Neo-Marxist and the Global
 
Reach schools concur that multinational corporations are a
 
detriment to host countries, the Neo-Classical and the Neo-

Mercantilist schools view the MNCs as benefiting the host
 
country. The Neo-Mercantilists, however, view the host
 
state's benefits as a factor of the home country's interests.
 
The Sovereignty-at-Bay school holds that MNCs have, overall,
 
a beneficial effect on both the home and host countries.23
 
Generally speaking there are two major limitations ^
 
intrinsic to the various approaches. The first stems from
 
the selection of data, which appears to be chosen on the
 
basis that it supports the original contentions. This in
 
turn raises serious questions regarding the objectivity of
 
the studies. The second limitation concerns the general
 
ization of conclusions on the impact of the MNCs. That is,
 
the studies tend to view all MNCs as similar and fail to
 
analyze their impact according to their various industries,
 
or according to the specific needs and circumstances sur
 
rounding the individual host countries.
 
The alternative approach, detailed in the sub
 
sequent chapter, is an attempt to overcome these limita
 
tions. It also considers the impact that recent trends,
 
23see Appendix A for a table summarizing the various
 
schools.
 
2.0 
namely inter-MNC competition, will have on LDC-MNC re
 
lations. This alternative approach relies heavily on the
 
Sovereignty-at-Bay school while simultaneously drawing from
 
the other schools in the attempt to provide an eclectic
 
approach to the analysis of MNCs.
 
Chapter 3
 
THE IMPACT OF I4tJCs ON DEVELOPMENT:
 
AN ALTERI^ATIVE APPROACH
 
Objective and Methodology
 
The Objective
 
As suggested in the introduction, this study exa
 
mines the impact of MNCs on development in general, and on
 
the recent development efforts of Turkey specifically.
 
The Hypotheses. This study is rooted in two hypoth
 
eses. First, that multinational corporations are promoters
 
of development, and as such are agents of development.
 
Second, that any single approach is not applicable to all
 
MNC-LDC relationships.
 
The Methodology
 
The impact of multinational corporations on host
 
countries is examined with respect to such issues as the
 
balance of payments, the transfer of technology, levels of
 
employment, and host government revenues from IlNCs. The
 
analysis of these issues will, for the most part, be the
 
oretical. The concern is to show whether multinational
 
corporations can be beneficial to the development of the
 
host countries in general, and of Turkey in particular.
 
This will be accomplished by examining the relevant growth
 
and development statistics and through a review of current
 
literature.
 
The development of this alternative approach requires
 
several restrictive assumptions. They are:
 
1. As this study is mainly concerned with the impact
 
of MNCs on host countries it is important to isolate their
 
role, therefore, it has proven necessary to base this ap
 
proach on the assumption that the host governments have the
 
best interest of their constituency, and hence the country
 
in mind. Though radical scholars would argue that the deci
 
sion made by local governments are partially produced by the
 
income distributions, which in turn, are a function of the
 
MNCs and the capitalist economy, this level of analysis
 
remains out of the breadth of this study. The question then,
 
with which this study deals is whether a host country whose
 
government is committed to development can effectively use
 
the MNC as a means of enhancing this goal.
 
2. This approach is based on the premise that for
 
eign direct investment need not be, and in fact is not a
 
zero sum game. The mere fact that an agreement is reached
 
between the host country and the MNC, suggests that all
 
parties involved perceived their projected benefits as
 
outweighing their estimated costs.
 
3. This approach also concurs with the Sovereignty­
at-Bay and Global Reach approaches, in that multinational
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GorpGrations are becoming anatlonal entities in their
 
quests to increase profits and/or power. The recent
 
competition between MNCs has brought about the necessity
 
for corporate loyalty to overcome national loyalty.
 
4. This approach is rooted in the premise that
 
economic growth is a necessary, but not a sufficient pre
 
requisite for economic development.^
 
5. In this study the multinational enterprises are
 
viewed merely as a tool to aiding host governments in their
 
quests for economic development. As such, they are not the
 
solution, but simply a potentially important piece to the
 
puzzle of development. Their basic role in this approach is
 
to promote economic growth of the host country through the
 
use of appropriate technology and more efficient use of time
 
and input materials. In light of this premise the MNC
 
cannot be held solely responsible for the failure of eco
 
nomic development, nor can they, by the same token, receive
 
all the credit if and when the goal is met. Rather, it is
 
the responsibility of the host government to assure the
 
transformation of growth into development.
 
iThe difference being that economic growth rep
 
resents a quantitative improvement (GNP/capita), whereas
 
economic development implies a qualitative improvement in
 
the standard of living (education, health, income dis
 
tribution, etc.). Also see, Adelman and Morris, Economic
 
Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries (Stanford
 
Press, 1973); W. Steward and P. Streeten, "New Strategies
 
for Development: Poverty, Income Distribution and Growth"
 
in Wilber (1979).
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Some Limitations of Ttig Study
 
The analysis of the impact of multinational corp
 
orations requires in-depth examinations on a wide range of
 
issues; namely economic, social, and political. Due to time
 
and space limitations, each of these factors can only be
 
incorporated in the overall analysis, rather than be indepen
 
dently developed.
 
Ideally, a comprehensive study of MNCs should be
 
directed towards providing policy implications with regards
 
to promoting or discouraging MNC involvement in Third World
 
development plans. Since the study in question is mainly
 
concerned with an analysis of the MNC *s role in development,
 
it is limited to general policy implications.
 
Furthermore, it must be noted that one of the prob
 
lems in the analysis on the impact of multinational corp
 
orations on a host country is the amount of speculation
 
required when comparing the costs and benefits of MNCs to
 
some other alternative--namely, that which would have taken
 
place in the absence of foreign direct investment. In this
 
respect, analyses are, at best, very difficult to quantify
 
and remain in most cases merely theoretical.
 
Despite the above mentioned limitations, the pro
 
posed approach is justified in that is is a step towards a
 
systematic reconciliation of the theoretical issues ex
 
pounded by the various schools.
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In what follows, the methodology suggested in this
 
chapter will be developed and applied to an analysis of
 
the impact of MNCs on development.
 
Chapter 4
 
QUEST FOR DEVELOPMENT
 
AND THE ROLE OF MIJCs
 
The purpose of this chapter is to' develop an eclectic
 
synthesis of the above mentioned approaches, while taking
 
into account the recent trends in international economic
 
relations.
 
MNCs as a Source of Development Finance
 
It appears that the general concensus among the less
 
developed countries, though less prevalent today, is that
 
the process of industrialization would lead to the develop
 
ment of the economy.1 Eager to develop, many LDCs imple
 
mented the process of industrialization in total disregard
 
of traditional economic, social, and cultural values.^ All
 
^It could be argued that the five stages leading to
 
economic growth, as forwarded by Walt W. Rostow, became the
 
guideline for many LDG: RostowVs schema was a historical
 
desGription of the stages that the West, specifically Eng
 
land, had experienced on their way to development. For an^
 
in-depth description of Rostow's five stages see W.W. Rostow,
 
ed., The Economics of Take-off into Sustained Growth^
 
(London: Macmi11an, 1964). Rostow first developed his
 
schema in 1956 in the Economic Journal, 66 (March 1956),
 
2see Alberto Martinelli, "The Political and Social
 
Impact of Transnational Corporations" in Harry Makler ed.,
 
The New International Economy (Beverly Hills: Sage Pub­
lications, 19S'Zy.
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efforts were geared towards the achievement of economic
 
growth. Though many countries experienced an increase in
 
growth (GNP/capita), economic development remained question
 
able.
 
The causes for the failure of development are many
 
and complex. Though there are certain barriers that can be
 
singled out as prevalent, a generalization is nearly impossi
 
ble as the extent of their impact varies according to the
 
countries' particular characteristics. Nevertheless, some
 
of these barriers need to be mentioned. One of the more
 
common problems associated with the development of Third
 
World countries is the attempt to impatiently transform an
 
agricultural society into an industrial one.
 
Another aspect that needs to be considered is the
 
source of development finance. The three main sources of
 
capital are domestic savings, foreign aid, and foreign
 
direct investment via multinational corporations.
 
The importance of domestic savings as a source of
 
finance is a contested issue. That is, while the Neo
 
classical school argues that the underdevelopment of the
 
capital market, along with the high marginal propensity to
 
consume (MPG) endemic to Third World countries, fail to
 
generate enough capital for domestic savings to be
 
considered a viable source of development finance. On
 
the other hand, the Neo-Marxists point to their studies
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indicating that MNCs finance a majority of their operations
 
from local savings.
 
It must be pointed out, however, that while local
 
savings are able to finance some ventures,their ability to
 
finance the overall development of the country is unlikely.
 
Furthermore, the primitiveness of the capital market of
 
most LDCs limits the transfer of capital. As such, it must
 
be concluded that local savings is incapable of financing
 
development.
 
Following World War II, foreign aid was seen as a
 
means of providing the much needed capital to LDCs. Ac
 
cording to the Pearson Commission, however, it appears that
 
the flow of aid to the less developed countries is likely
 
to decline in the future.^ In light of this, one could
 
then suggest that foreign investment via the multinational
 
corporation is bound to become more important to the LDCs'
 
overall economic plan. As such, a clearer understanding,
 
and hopefully an objective interpretation of the MNC is of
 
the essence.
 
The Role of MNCs
 
Speaking in the broadest of terms, there appears to
 
be three major sources of conflict stemming from the exis­
^See Harry G. Johnson, "The Multinational Corporation
 
as a Development Agent", Columbia Journal of World Business
 
5 (1970);25-30.
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tenee and actions of MNCs in less developed countries.
 
First, the multinational corporation is a foreign entity
 
that behaves in an unusual or wrong fashion. Second, the
 
international mobility of the MNC enables them to take
 
advantage of the host cotintry's juridical boundaries. Third,
 
the MNC is often viewed as a vehicle for the exertion of the
 
parent state's interests."^
 
Recent attempts by international agencies, such as
 
the United Nations (U.N.) and the Organization for Economic
 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), to work out codes of
 
conduct for multinational corporations on a wide range of
 
issues, underlines the relevance of the economic, social,
 
and political impacts of MNCs.^
 
Thus, to categorically suggest that MNCs are either
 
beneficial or detrimental to a host state is a simplifica
 
tion of a complex issue. In addition to looking at coun
 
tries independently, it is necessary to look at multi
 
national corporations individually. That is, the multi
 
national corporation's effect on the LDC will vary given
 
its orientation (extractive, manufacturing, service or
 
^Blake and Walters (1976) p.97.
 
5One must, however, question the ability of such
 
supranational bodies to enforce any measures. It appears,
 
based on the historical record, that the abidance to such
 
guidelines as might be forwarded would merely be on a
 
cooperative and voluntary basis, thereby reducing the
 
efficacy of such international regulatory commissions.
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banking), This is one of the major weaknesses in the
 
analyses of multinational corporatious, As stated previ'­
ously, the various schools tend to view all MNCs in the same
 
light, and there is no attempt to differentiate among HNCs,
 
Viewing the matter from this perspective, it seems
 
evident that the< impact of multinational corporations on
 
host countries will vary in accordance to its orientation.
 
For example, it is generally held that the impact of
 
manufacturing, service, and banking MNCs tends to be viewed
 
as more beneficial to the local economy, than the extractive
 
industries, as they have a direct stake in the growth of the
 
economy.^ While many scholars are opposed to manufacturing
 
enterprises on the basis that the goods produced are geared
 
towards the constimption patterns of the rich and, as such,
 
are not conducive towards the development of the local
 
economy as a whole, it can be argued that this is an inter
 
nal weakness on the part of the host country and the MNC
 
should, therefore, not take the brunt of the accusation.
 
To clarify this point, the term 'internal weakness' needs to
 
be elaborated. Given the fact that the local governments
 
must approve the entry of any type of foreign direct invest
 
ment, the burden of selecting that enterprise which will
 
most benefit the economy rests on its shoulders. The ques­
^In contrast, extractive industries are viewed as less
 
concerned with the growth of the host country's economy as
 
the product is merely extracted and sold outside the local
 
economy. For further interest, see Evans (1971).
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tion of selectivity, then, is clearly the role of the ruling
 
bureaucracy. Clearly, the process of selection cannot be
 
left to the multinational corporation.which operates on
 
sound business terms and would not turn its entry right down
 
on the basis that its product might not be commensurate with
 
the host country's development plan. In this study, the
 
1
 
multinational corporations are viewed merely as a tool to
 
aiding host governments in their quests for economic develop
 
ment. Therefore, they are not the solution, but simply a
 
potentially important piece to the puzzle of development.
 
The process of selection must also take into account
 
the prospective benefits offered by rival MNCs. In the past
 
a country's ability to be selective was minimal. The major
 
ity of the MNCs were U.S. based and competition between MNCs
 
was relatively low. In the present era, however, the
 
scenario has changed. There has been an increase in Euro
 
pean, Japanese, and Third World multinational corporations
 
emerging to challenge the established MNCs.^ This increase
 
in MNCs clearly adds to the bargaining power and selec
 
tivity of the host country. Gilpin writes:
 
..,the emergence of new centers of economic
 
7See David A. Heenan and Warren J, Keegan, "The Rise
 
of Third World Multinationals",The Atlantic Community Quart
 
erly (Spring 1979); Raj^ond Vernon (1977). For a recent
 
survey on the increase of Third World financial institutions
 
in specific, see the Economist, November 21-27 1981 "A
 
Survey of Banking in the Middle East",
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power in the so-called underdeveloped world
 
(The Arabs, Iran, Brazil, etc.) challenge
 
the political and economic framework which
 
has benefited the American multinationals.
 
The diminution of what has been a Pax Ame
 
ricana and the rise of powers hostile to
 
the global activities of American multi
 
national corporations threaten these MITCs'
 
reign over intemation economic relations.°
 
In the earlier phase, LDC's quest for industriali
 
zation resulted in a competition among each other to attract
 
foreign investment through investment incentives such as tax
 
breaks. Today, as the competition between MNCs over market
 
shares increases, it should translate into added benefits
 
for the host country. According to John Hein, Director of
 
International Economics at the Conference Board, during the
 
period 1971-1979 the U.S. share of the 500 largest indus
 
trial firms declined from 280 to 219.^ David Heenan and
 
Warren Keegan also predict continued "Third World corporate
 
intrusions into the domestic markets of even the most
 
established multinationals.
 
From the above arguments, one could conclude that a
 
host government which is responsive to its political
 
constituency could use,the multinational corporations as a
 
viable means toward the development of that country. The
 
^Robert Gilpin, "The Political Economy of the Multi
 
national Corporation: Three Contrasting Perspectives", The
 
American Political Science Review 70 (1976): 190.
 
^Los Angeles Times, 8 April 1981.
 
iOHeenan and Keegan (1979) p.120.
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new found power of selectivity of the government will better
 
allow a host government to set the conditions of foreign
 
investment which are commensurate to its economic develop
 
ment.
 
The Impact of MNCs
 
Some of the impact in MNC-LDC relationships which
 
has been criticized by various schools consists of such
 
issues as the balance of payments, the transfer of tech
 
nology, levels of employment, and taxes. This section will
 
examine the role of MNCs on the basis of these issues and
 
will review some of the steps that countries have taken to
 
offset the undesirable impacts of foreign direct investment.
 
Balance of Payments
 
MNC critics hold that multinationals generally tend
 
to contribute to a deficit in the balance of payments
 
accounts by taking more international currency out of the
 
country than they bring in. As evidenced by Evans, the
 
repatriated profits to U.S. parent companies during the
 
period 1950-1965 exceeded net new private investment by $7.5
 
billion. According to Blake and Walters, income from U.S.
 
direct investment was $10.4 billion, while the outflow of
 
capital from the United States amounted to $3.4 billion.
 
l^Blake and Walters (1976) p.95.
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Though at first glance such figures seem to indicate
 
the negative impact of MNCs on the balance of payments, they
 
may be somewhat misleading when the balance of payments ac
 
count is looked at as a whole. On this issue Frank argues
 
that these flows are "logically unrelated" as the investment
 
of a given year cannot be compared to the outflow of the
 
same year since profits are related to prior investments.12
 
However, when one looks at these flows over a span of fif
 
teen years, as has Evans, they become to a certain extent
 
related as they represent the investments of prior years
 
and the outflow of capital during the same period. As such,
 
these flows must have an impact on the host country's
 
balance of payments account--the degree of which, however,
 
remains speculative.
 
Frank's contention that these flows Cannot be the
 
only criterion used in the comparison is justifiable. In
 
addition to capital flight, such factor as the levels of
 
imports and exports need also be taken into account. In
 
looking at the levels of exports, it is argued that the
 
subsidiaries of MNCs are more effective in exporting their
 
products than the domestic firms. This is usually accom
 
plished by the MNC by increasing the levels of productivity
 
and efficiency whether through capital accumulation, the
 
12Isaiah Frank, Foreign Enterprises in Developihg
 
Countries, (Ba11imore: John Hopkins University Press, 1980),
 
p.30.
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upgrading of tlie labor force or through scale and agglomer
 
ation effects. The reduced costs allow the product to be
 
more competitive on a global scale and therefore better
 
suited for export. Furthermore, the MNCs' access to the
 
world market through links allows a greater volume of
 
exports than would otherwise have been possible. In add
 
ition, when one considers the fact that in some cases l®lCs
 
expand overseas in order to circumvent regional trade barri
 
ers, they clearly contribute to the host country's foreign
 
exchange through exports.
 
Another way MNCs can add to a host country's balance
 
of payments is by locally producing goods that were previ
 
ously imported, thereby lessening the strain on the coun
 
try's foreign exchange reserves. It could, of course, be
 
argued that local entrepreneurs could undertake the task of
 
producing import substitutes rather than the foreign sub
 
sidiaries. In many cases this does occur. In other cases,
 
the economies of scale and the lack of teehnological exper
 
tise prove to be massive barriers to such undertakings. In
 
such events it might be advantageous to locally produce the
 
product, via the MNC, rather than importing it.
 
One of the problems with the strategy of import sub
 
stitution, however, as pointed out by Vernon, is that
 
l^Vernon (1971) p.176.
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generally the decision to produce locally is based on
 
the availability of local inputs and the existence of a
 
domestic market alone, rather than taking the costs of
 
production into account. The upshot of Vernon's argiiment
 
is that the decision to implement the strategy of import
 
substitution is not a simple one and should not be rooted in
 
the urge to industrialize. Such factors as the market,
 
r
 
costs, employment, availability of resources, and compara
 
tive advantage should be carefully scrutinized before any
 
decision is rendered.
 
MNC critics charge that the balance of payments ac
 
count is also ill-effected by the over-pricing of inter
 
mediary goods and technology during parent-subsidiary trans
 
actions. According to Evans, this could prove "to be an
 
even more important source of extra returns from manufactur
 
ing investment in less developed countries. It must be
 
pointed out, in all fairness, that the charges that the
 
parent companies overcharge in the transfer of intermediate
 
goods and technology does not universally hold true.^^ The
 
reasons for the various practices will be left to a later
 
l^Evans (1971) p.679.
 
l5See Behrman (1970) p.21, A survey of sixty four MNGs
 
in Australia points to various practices ranging from con
 
siderable overpricing to pronounced underpricing. Though
 
Australia is not an LDC it constitutes one of the few stud
 
ies which deal specifically with transfer of technology and
 
intermediate goods.
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point in the chapter, when the issue of taxes is discussed.
 
Resentment generated by MNC profit repatriation on
 
the amounts of repatriated profits by MNGs is accentuated by
 
the ^act that they generally tend to avail themselves of
 
local savings rather than importing the much needed capital.
 
The LDCs point to the fact that not only do MNCs repatriate
 
a great share of the profits to the parent company, but that
 
the profits were generated by local savings, thereby pre
 
senting a double blow to the country's quest for development.
 
Muller estimates that during the period 1965-1970, 78 per
 
cent of the capital used by MNCs was locally financed.
 
The impact of the balance of payments on the overall
 
development is far from conclusive. For instance, radical
 
scholars have found it difficult to support the contention
 
that the appropriated portion of the surplus is significant
 
enough to prevent the development process in LDCs. This
 
does not in any way imply, however, that the issue has not
 
warranted the attention it has received. Though it may not
 
be a sufficient factor" in preventing the development of the
 
LDCs, it is an important contributing aspect in the process
 
of economic development.
 
The diametrically opposed conclusions of the various
 
schools on the issue of balance of pa5mients suggests that
 
16see Ronald Muller, "The Multinational Corporation
 
and the Underdevelopment of the Third World", in Wilber ed.,
 
(1979), p.163.
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a generalization is nearly impossible, and it is therefore
 
necessary to analyze each case independently.
 
Transfer of Technology
 
One of the attractive aspects of foreign direct in
 
vestment to host countries are the benefits received from
 
the transfer of technology. This is apparent in the recent
 
decision of the government of Turkey (GOT) to begin actively
 
seeking new investments by foreign firms, after having a
 
history of hostility towards foreign investors. Similarly,
 
India and China are also presently seeking foreign invest
 
ment, though exclusively in the domain of high technology.
 
The main alternatives to the MNCs, as a mean of
 
technology transfers, is its purchase through licensing, or
 
its production. The latter option is usually waived due to
 
the high costs involved in the research and development of
 
the technology, as well as the shortage of scientists in
 
many LDCs. Though licensing is an alternative that is used,
 
it is not always possible. The licensors tend to be selec
 
tive in the licensing of technology for fear of losing
 
control over the innovation, and decline many applications.
 
In this light, it appears that the main route for the trans
 
fer of technology rests with foreign direct investment.
 
As in most of the literature on the impact of multi
 
national corporations, conflicting views emerge on this
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issue as well. l^Thile orthodox scholars see MNCs as agents
 
for the diffusion of technology to LDCs, radical scholars
 
view the MNCs as the cause of, rather than the solution, to
 
the existing technology gap, They argue that MNCs hinder
 
the development of the host state's technological capabil
 
ities by attracting local scientists and researchers through
 
higher wages and better facilities. Consequently this re
 
sults in the perpetuation of the dependency of host states
 
on the advanced countries for the transfer of technology.
 
Multinational corporations are also accused of overcharging
 
for technology which, LDCs claim, is often dated.
 
In addition to the economic aspect, the transfer of
 
technology has far reaching social and political dimensions.
 
X-Jhile many countries have raised tariffs and barriers to
 
foster the development of industries, there are only a few
 
cases where such restrictions apply to the transfer of tech
 
nology. Rather, there is an implicit assumption that tech
 
nology is merely a good that can be bought, sold and uti
 
lized as any other product, regardless of the contexts to
 
which it is applied. That is, technology which is deve1­
oped according to the needs of a specific society is often
 
ill-suited and inappropriate to the conditions prevalent in
 
the importing country.17
 
Though there are explicit similarities between the
 
17Martinelli in Makler (1982) p.108.
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goals of the multinational corporations and the LDCs-­
such as effective use of resources and increased produc­
tivity--it is important that a distinction between the
 
importation of a specific technology and its implementation
 
be made. According to Fatemi, failure to do so will result
 
in a "sociological backlash against technology and modern
 
ization in general."18
 
The main issue revolves around the introduction of
 
appropriate technology to the LDCs. A prototype of appro
 
priate technology was the movement in the 1950s, which urged
 
the tranfer to LDCs of machinery that had become obsolete
 
by Western standards, and less capital intensive than the
 
new machinery. The problem with this approach, however, is
 
the general assumption that the LDCs are simply behind the
 
developed world, and what was once beneficial to the devel
 
oped countries is presently suitable to the LDCs. This view
 
completely ignores the cultural and historical values par
 
ticular to the LDCs. According to Cardoso, the technology
 
implemented by mderdeveloped countries must constitute a
 
blend rather than a purely imitative model of the indus
 
trialized countries.19
 
losrow Fatemi, "Multinational Corporations, Devel
 
oping Countries, and Transfer of Technology: A Cultural
 
Perspective" Unpublished paper. (Middle Tennessee State
 
University,March 1981).
 
^^Femando Cardoso, "Development Under Fire" in Makler
 
ed., (1982)
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As introduction of the latest technology may not
 
benefit the LDC as a whole, it appears that a blend between
 
modem and traditional technology would be more appropriate.
 
It seems evident that the decision to introduce technology
 
cannot solely be based on economic and technical issues, but
 
rather must consider the cultural, historical, social and
 
political dimensions of himan existence.
 
The issue is indeed a difficult one to resolve.
 
Without the transfer of technology via the MNC, can the LDGs
 
afford the Ixaxury of waiting for the development of indige
 
nous technological innovations? The recent decisions of
 
Turkey, India, and China to open their borders to foreign
 
direct investment seem to suggest that the task of develop
 
ing technology is a formidable one requiring more time than
 
permissible.
 
Hence, the solution appears to be based on the
 
transfer of technology within a controlled environment.
 
Though such international bodies as UNCTAD and OECD are
 
advancing codes of conduct for the transfer of technology,
 
the ultimate responsibility of assuring the transfer of
 
adequate technology rests in the hands of the host govern
 
ment.
 
Closely related to the issue of technology is the
 
question of employment. It is on this aspect of MNC-LDC
 
relations that this study will now focus.
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Employment
 
Radical scholars argue that the implementation of
 
capital intensive means of production results in a higher
 
level of unemployment. The question then is how to recon
 
cile the need for technology with the levels of unemploy
 
ment that it generates: Since unemployment cannot be elim
 
inated lest there is a drastic change in the modes of pro
 
duction, and since this does not appear to be the case, at
 
least within the foreseeable future, it is essential to find
 
a compromise that will result in minimizing the social costs
 
of technology.
 
Once again the multinational corporation has emerged
 
as a focal point in this analysis, Bamet and Muller hold
 
that MNCs create unemployment on a global scale. Other
 
charges stem from the accusations that MNCs attract a vast
 
pool of laborers from the traditional setting and are there
 
by able to keep the wages and the organization of labor
 
unions in check.
 
At this point it is needed to speculate on what would
 
have occured in the absence of llNCs. In the event that
 
multinational corporations were not permitted entry, and the
 
local entrepreneurs undertook the task of industrialization,
 
would the current situation be drastically altered? In all
 
likelihood it would not. Though the local entrepreneurs
 
20see Sunkel in Modelski ed., (1979) pp.222-223,
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would not have access to the latest technology, they would
 
still utilize the most modern technology which they could
 
get licensed for. As such, their impact on the level of
 
unemployment would, arguably, not be that marked. Though
 
MNGs hire what appears to be a sizeable number of laborers,
 
the figure is not that impressive when taken as a percent of
 
the total labor force. By the same token, it appears un
 
likely that the local industrialists would increase the
 
figure by any meaningful manner. Furthermore, studies have
 
shown that MNCs prove to be more responsive to local govern
 
ment incentives to locate in economically depressed re­
gions.
 
In order to increase their benefits from foreign
 
direct investment, many countries are, among other measures,
 
establishing requirements about the number and nature of
 
positions that the multinational corporation must reserve
 
for local employees and managers. In addition, as a means
 
of controlling the level of unemployment some countries are
 
requiring that MI^Cs pay sizeable indemnity payments to those
 
laid off--regardless of the reasons. This latter measure
 
usually takes place in more developed countries, however.
 
The lack of a strong labor movement in most LDCs makes this
 
approach less likely and less probable.
 
21see Behrman (1970) pp.19-20.
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Taxes
 
Host governments are often attracted to foreign
 
direct investment by the taxes that will be remitted'. This
 
holds especially true in areas in which the economies of
 
scale and technological expertise prevent local entrepre
 
neurs from developing such industries. For instance, Blake
 
and Walters write that in 1970 the major oil companies re
 
mitted $8,420 billion to members of the Organization of
 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the form of taxes.22
 
Though the sums of taxes appear substantial, it is argued
 
that they are far less than what they should be. Radical
 
scholars have pointed out that MNCs have adopted extra­
legal means of reducing such payments. One of the mora
 
common methods involves the over-pricing of intermediate
 
goods to the subsidiary in order to reduce the profits, and
 
hence the taxes. Depending on the tax legislations, MNCs
 
also underprice goods being transerred to subsidiaries. If
 
taxes in the manufacturing country, for instance, are higher
 
than those of the importing country, it is advantageous to
 
under value the goods.23 The result of this type of trans
 
action reduces the foreign exchange revenues of the host
 
country along with the tax revenues
 
^^Blake and Walters (1976) p.100
 
^^Barnet and Muller (1974) p. 157
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Another technique implemented by MNCs is what Bamet
 
and Muller termed "(the) modem version of the 18th century
 
'triangular trade By this method, the MNCs make use
 
of tax havens (such as the Bahamas) by shipping underpriced
 
exports and overpriced imports to tax free ports, from where
 
the goods are later reexported at regular market price, or
 
higher, to subsidiaries in other countries. The attempts
 
of host governments to collect the due taxes are frustrated
 
by the limited ability of its internal revenue services to
 
deal with the highly sophisticated accountants and the
 
complicated corporate structures of multinational corp
 
orations.
 
On the issue of multinational corporations the late
 
President of the AFL-CI0, George Meany, while testifying
 
before the Subcommittee on Intemational Trade of the
 
Committee on Finance, United States Senate, stated:
 
The multinational firms can juggle their
 
bookkeeping and their prices and their
 
taxes. Their export and import transac
 
tions are within the corporation, deter
 
mined by the executives of the corporation.
 
This is not foreign trade. Surely it is
 
not foreign competition.25
 
It must be kept in mind, however, that the quest to
 
reduce taxable income is not limited to foreign investors
 
24ibid. p.158.
 
^^Hearing before the Subcommittee on International
 
Trade of the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate. 93d Cong.,
 
1st sess., 27, 28, 29 February; 1, 6 March 1973, p.397.
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alone. Local enterprises also seek to avoid taxes. Though
 
they do not have the abilities of MNCs as far as intra-

subsidiary transactions are concerned, they behave in a
 
rather similar fashion by sending undeclared profits to
 
foreign banks. As all governments are aware, the que'St
 
to avoid taxes is universal indeed.
 
Conclusion
 
From the foregoing it appears that the impact of
 
multinational corporations is complicated and controversial.
 
A generalization of their impact detracts from an objective
 
interpretation of the role of an MNC, This is not to say,
 
however, that all MNCs are beneficial to a host country's
 
economic development plan. The increase in MNC competition
 
should, however, allow the host governments to be more se
 
lective in their choice of MNCs. Furthermore, the LDCs
 
have gathered years of experience in their dealings with the
 
MNCs and have adopted policies in order to increase their
 
overall benefits from foreign direct investment, without
 
substantially detracting from the profit potential of the
 
MNC. Some of these policies have been implemented on a
 
single country basis, while others have been complimented by
 
regional efforts to control the impact of the multinational
 
corporations. A case in point would be the Andean Common
 
Market in which the members have agreed on a set of string
 
ent rules. Blake and Walters have provided a brief look at
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some of these measures which appear instructive:
 
First, foreigp investment is prohibited in
 
a number of industries, including banking,
 
insurance, broadcasting, publishing, and
 
internal trahsportation. Second, new invest
 
ments and most existing investments must
 
divest itself of majority ownership (the
 
fade-out formula) within 15 years in Chile,
 
Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela and within
 
20 years in Bolivia and Ecuador, so that
 
national investors participation will be
 
at least 51 percent. Third, annual earn
 
ings repatriated by foreign subsidiary
 
firms cannot exceed 14 percent of the
 
investment. Fourth, a foreign subsidiary
 
may not pay its parent company or other
 
affiliate for the use of intangible tech
 
nology know-how; in addition, clauses or
 
practices that tend to restrict competition
 
or production or otherwise increase the
 
cost of the technology to the host state
 
are prohibited.26
 
The example of the Andean Common Market could very
 
well be the stepping stone for other countries that desire
 
foreign direct investment, but on their ovm terms and
 
commensurate with their specific needs. The inter-MNC
 
competition will most likely be the factor which controls
 
the enforcibility of such measures, The threat of being
 
replaced by a competitor will force the MNCs to adapt to
 
the provisions--as decreed.
 
A crucial element in the development of an economy
 
is the strategy implemented by the local government, As we
 
have seen the process of industrialization has not been
 
tantamount to development, and has left many leaders disap­
^^Blake and Waltera (1976) p.123.
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pointed and forced to reevaluate their strategy, and at
 
times alter it for one that is more inline with that coun
 
try's particular needs and characteristics. It must be
 
remembered that multinational corporations are merely a tool
 
for the host governments' economic development plans.
 
The next chapter will focus on the impact of multi­
national corporations on Turkey's economic development plans,
 
It will attempt to identify the potential role of MNCs in
 
that country, as well as look into the steps implemented by
 
the GOT to assure maximvim benefits from foreign direct in
 
vestment.
 
ter 5
 
THE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
 
ON TURKEY'S DEVELOPMENT PROCESS
 
This chapter analyzes the effects that multina­
tional corporations have had on Turkey's development
 
efforts by utilizing the procedure explained in Chapter 3.
 
First, a historical background examining the role of MNCs
 
as a source of development finance will be provided. This
 
will be followed by a critical analysis of the impact of
 
MNCs on Turkey's developfflent. Third, recent policies will
 
be reviewed in view of their relevance to foreign capital,
 
and finally future prospects will be briefly outlined,
 
Turkey's Experience With Foreign Capital
 
In 1980, Turkey reevaluated its economic policies
 
and determined that fundamental changes were necessary if it
 
were to integrate in the world market, and improve the
 
domestic situation. As Ebiri observed, the new outward-

oriented policies presented by the Demirel Administration
 
on January 24, 1^80 were attempted not because of their
 
preference to the traditional strategy of etatism, but rath
 
er because the latter was no longer feasible.^ For example,
 
the strikes that plagued Turkey's industries and the rise
 
^Kutlay Ebiri, "Turkish Apertura", METU Studies
 
in Development (3/4) (Ankara 1980):209-254. See Appendix
 
B for chronology of events.
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in the price of oil made it very difficult and costly for
 
the country to continue its inward policy of import sub
 
stitution.2
 
The January 1980 economic reforms consisted of a
 
fundamental policy change. The reforms called for the
 
development of an outward oriented economy, as well as for
 
an increased role to market forces. Briefly, the reforms
 
consisted of four points; (1) a more accurate rate of ex-

change--the Turkish Lira (T.L.) was devalued by 33 percent
 
vis-a-vis the dollar; (2) a tighter monetary policy and the
 
freeing of interest rates; (3) added incentives to promote
 
exports; and (4) a drift from the policy of etatism.^ In
 
addition, administrative regulations concerning imports and
 
exports were simplified, and a basic attitude change toward
 
foreign investment was called for.
 
In the past, applications for foreign investment
 
were shuffled between the state planning office, the minis
 
tries of commerce, industry, and finance, resulting in
 
nearly a two year span before any decisions were reached,
 
which usually tended to be negative. Partly as a result of
 
this bureaucracy foreign investors shied away from Turkey
 
2The Economist estimates that 7.7 million man-days
 
had been lost in the first 9 months of 1980 as a result of
 
strikes. 9/12-18/81, p.9.
 
)iri (1980) p.210. Also the interest rates were
 
freed on July 1, 1980.
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(domestic and economic instabilities also caused foreign
 
investors to turn away from Turkey). Under the new economic
 
policy's attempts to attract foreign businesses, the deci
 
sion making for FBI has been centralized within the State
 
Planning Organization (SPG) presently headed by a close
 
associate of Mr. Ozal, Mr. Yildirim Akturk, who is also a
 
strong advocate of foreign investment.
 
Turkey's recent economic policy is arguably the
 
result of the dialectical process of Turkey's past econom­
ic policies. Briefly, in the first twenty five years of
 
the Turkish Republic, the main goal of the government was
 
self-sufficiency. This led to a certain coolness toward
 
foreign capital, placing emphasis both on state run enter
 
prises (SEEs) and on the building of an infrastructure.
 
Though Turkey preferred a capitalist oriented economy, the
 
lack of a strong private sector and the shortage of capital
 
prevented its implementaion. Consequently, Turkey devel
 
oped a new model which consisted of an amalgamation of the
 
perceived respective advantages of capitalism and social­
ism--a mixed economy. The basic idea of the mixed economy
 
was for the private and state sectors to work together in
 
advancing Turkey's economy.
 
the shortage of capital proved, however, a massive
 
barrier. The acceptance of foreign aid, as a means to
 
overcome this barrier following World War II constituted a
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basic theoretical shift in the approach to etatism.'^
 
Spurred by huge amounts of foreign assistance Turkey experi
 
enced growth, and a strong private sector began to emerge.
 
During the 1950's, the uncoordinated policies of the Mend­
eres regime along with the high debts incurred by accepting
 
foreign aid, the inefficiency of the SEEs, the politically
 
controlled prices, and the increased public demands for
 
goods and services led to shortages and severe inflation.
 
The faulting economic situation prompted acute deflationary
 
and stablization measures, which in turn germinated polit
 
ical dissention and led to the overthrow of the Menderes
 
regime and his Democratic Party in 1960.5
 
In 1960, the creation of the State Planning Orga
 
nization (SPG) marked the implementation of economic plan
 
ning. The five year plans (they are now in the fourth)
 
were an attempt to better organize Turkey's quest for devel
 
opment.5
 
The record reflects that during the period 1950­
1980, Turkey experienced an average annual growth rate of
 
around 6.5 percent. Real growth, however, was reduced by
 
^See Z.Y. Hershlag. Turkey: The Challenge of Grov7th,
 
2d ed., Leiden: E.J. Brill (Netherlands, 1968). ~
 
^See Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy
 
1959-1975.(Boulder: Westview Press, 1977) for an account of
 
the political factors which contributed to the overthrow.
 
^See Appendix C for a table on the Macroeconomic
 
goals of the five year plans.
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an annual population growth rate of 2.5 percent.7 During
 
the same period Turkey has experienced two major inter
 
ruptions in its growth; the first occured between 1958-1961
 
as a result of the Menderes Administration's inflationary
 
policies, and the second began in 1977, of which Turkey is
 
presently attempting a recovery. In 1977, Turkey had a
 
trade deficit of $3.4 billion, inflation X\?as at a record
 
high and unemployment at an unprecedented 25 percent.
 
The economic reform introduced by the Demirel
 
Administration, arid later implemented by. the military
 
government was geared to overcoming the barriers to Turkey's
 
economic development.
 
The Impact of Foreign investment
 
oil The Turkish Economy
 
As a result of the strong sense of nationalism
 
and the distrust of foreigners, coupled with the general
 
scarcity of capital during the world depression, foreign
 
direct investment via multinational corporations did not
 
play a significant role in the early Turkish economy.
 
Though the GOT liberalized its policies towards foreign di
 
rect investment in 1954, FDI remained limited by the gener
 
al sense of distrust and the requirement that 51 percent of
 
^From 1950 to 1980, the population increased from
 
19 m. to 45 m.
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the capital be held by Turkish nationals.® The bureau
 
cracy involved in approving the entry of foreign firms re
 
sulted in sizeable delays as the applications were shuffled
 
between the various ministries involved. Tansky estimates
 
that foreign investment in 1956 amounted to about 3 percent
 
of total investment.9
 
It was not until 1963 that foreign capital began to
 
increase. Ahmad calculated that during the period 1951-1961,
 
foreign capital invested in Turkey averaged T.L. 12.2 mil
 
lion a year, and that during 1962-1963 it had increased by
 
229 percent to T.L. 40.3 million.1® Foreign firms were
 
attracted to Turkey by the government's desire to industri
 
alize the Turkish economy and by the implementation of im
 
port substitution policies. The large market and the in
 
creased desire for consumer goods attracted foreign firms
 
into the production of manufacturing goods such as elec
 
trical home appliances, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and
 
automobiles. It has been estimated that during the period
 
1951-1965, 95.28 percent of foreign capital invested in
 
Turkey was devoted to manufacturing, while 0.21 percent went
 
®Though the requirement that 51 percent be held by
 
Turkish nationals is not wrong, it has caused some problems
 
for MNCs as the capital shortage in Turkey made it diffi
 
cult to find local partners.
 
^Leo Tansky, US and USSR Aid to Developing Countries
 
(New York; Praeger, 1967), p.49.
 
lOAhmad (1977) p.279.
 
into agricutture,;2.34 percent into service industries, 1.25
 
percent into mining, and 0.92 percent into construction.H
 
Foreign investment in the manufacturing sector has
 
benefited from an ideal enviroriment. That is, ; local inves­
tors have provided the bulk of the capital; an abundant
 
supply of relatively cheap labor has been available| and
 
government protectionist measures have created monopoly
 
status for MNCs.
 
By investing in the manufacturing of final goods,
 
MNCs did little to contribute to the building of the infra-,
 
structure necessary for the industrialization of the Turkish
 
economy. One point that needs to be elaborated on is the
 
claim that the local investors provided the bulk of the
 
capital. Though at first sight this upholds the radical
 
school's position that the investment capital is generated
 
by local savings and that MNCs do not provide the scarce
 
financial resources, it cannot be viewed in these terms when
 
applied to the Turkish case. Though Turkey does have a
 
capital shortage, the legislation in Turkey forbids MNCS
 
from owning more than 49 percent of the industry. So while
 
lbid. Ahmad gives a further breakdown in the
 
manufacturing investments: 26% into plastics and rubber
 
industries, 25% into chemical industries, 13% into the
 
electrical industry, and 11%, into processed foods, alcoholic
 
beverages and tobacco.
 
l^Mumtaz Soysal, "The Policy of Mixed Industrial
 
Enterprises in Turkey and its Socio-Political Consequences",
 
Development and Change 1, no.2 (1969-1970): 25.
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the claim that the local investors provide the bulk of the
 
capital is true (51 percent), the terms of foreign invest
 
ment prevents this example as being used to compliment the
 
radical critic.
 
Critics of foreign investment also point to the fact
 
that because of its heavy orientation in the manufacturing
 
sector, large scale imports are required merely to keep the
 
industries operating, and because of their involvement in
 
the manufacturing of import substitutes the goods are not
 
geared for export. In addition, capital flight has also
 
come to be an issue. Hie has estimated that 74.8 percent
 
of the foreign investment which entered Turkey has been
 
repatriated in the form of profits. Atilla Karaosman­
oglu, an ex-World Bank bureaucrat, has found the figure to
 
be even higher. According to his calculations, invest
 
ments by foreign companies totalled $112 million while the
 
sum repatriated amounted to $121 million. In this regard,
 
foreign investment has not contributed a major capital stock
 
to the Turkish economy.
 
Foreign investment has also not contributed to
 
l%alter F. Weiker, The Modernization of
 
(New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers" 1981), p,211.
 
l^Ahmad (1977) p.298. His figures were estimated
 
up to 1970. Though these figures show that a greater
 
amount than the investments were repatriated, they are not
 
conclusive with regard to their overall, impact on the
 
balance of payments as they do not take into account that
 
portion of the profits reinvested in the country,
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Turkey's balance of payments account. The lack of foreign
 
exchangej which has been singled out as ohd of the inhibi- .
 
tive factors to achieving development in the LDCs, cannot,
 
however, solely be attributed to the operations of the MNCs.
 
In 1980, on the whole, Turkish industries' raw material
 
imports accounted for 77.2 percent of total imports, re
 
ducing the foreign exchange reserves of the country.
 
Furthermore, the lack of foreign exchange is also a direct
 
result of Turkey's^attempt to industrialize in the shortest
 
possible time and trying to meet the optimistic industrial
 
growth rates projected by the SPO--which as Weiker points
 
out were politically rather than economically motivated.
 
This problem was further compounded by the high levels of
 
inefficiency on the part of the SEEs that failed to make
 
full use of the imported raw materials.
 
Turkish MNC critics also point to the fact that
 
foreign industries, because of the 'package investments in
 
ISihis figure was derived from those provided by the
 
Yapi ve Kredi Bankasi's December 1981 Monthly Economic
 
Letter. Because this figure includes that of the imports
 
of the foreign firms as well, and since separate figures
 
are not available for those firms with foreign shares (tech

nically all industries are considered Turkish as Turks hold
 
51% of the shares) it is impossible to derive the net effect
 
that MNCs have had on Turkey's balance of payments account.
 
One can conclude, however, that since MNCs account for 12,o
 
of gross sales in the manufacturing division, and due to
 
their limited involvement in other sectors, Turkish indus
 
tries (especially the SEEs) are responsible for the great
 
majority of the bill.
 
^^Weiker (1981) p.191.
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which they provide most everything from parts to marketing
 
techniques fail to make use of Turkey's subcontractors and
 
raw materials. Furthermore, they point to studies that have
 
shown that foreign industries tend to be more capital inten
 
sive than their local counterparts, and that the technology
 
used in Turkey is the outmoded equipment of the developed
 
world, thereby preventing Turkey from competing with the
 
overseas industries. It must also be pointed out that
 
industries with large shares of foreign capital, despite
 
being more capital intensive, employ an average of 458
 
workers, while the average number of workers employed by
 
Turkish private industries is 76 workers, Weiker also
 
points out that Hie has found the productivity of foreign
 
firms much higher than the Turkish industries; while
 
providing work for 6.5 percent of the labor force, foreign
 
firms have accounted for 11.7 percent of the gross sales
 
in the manufacturing sector.18
 
Foreign enterprises have also been accused of not
 
complementing the country's development as a whole. As
 
Soysal states, MHCs tend to concentrate in Western Turkey,
 
mainly Istanbul and Izmir rather than dispersing across the
 
coimtry. While this critic is accurate, it cannot be limit-

l^Ibid. pp.211-213.
 
ISlbid. In the late 1970s, it has been estimated
 
that foreign firms have provided 75,000 jobs.
 
ited to MNCs, local industries have also shown a strong
 
preference for Western Turkey. According to a census con
 
ducted in 1964 by the State Institute of Statistics, in the
 
18 principal counties of Turkey, the number of plants has
 
increased from 632 to 2,444 during the period 1950-1963,
 
while in the remaining 49 counties the number of plants
 
increased from 80 to 331. The reason for the preference
 
of Western Turkey is due to the fact that it is more devel
 
oped, has better communication systems, large ports, and
 
vertical and horizontal linkages between various industries.
 
Much of the Eastern region remains rural and has limited
 
accessibility.
 
According to Weiker, the radical right claims that
 
foreign investment has undermined Turkish nationalism and
 
that it has squeezed out many smaller industries, expecially
 
those in the Anatolian region.20 These accusations are,
 
however, debatable when one considers the fact that foreign
 
investment in Turkey has been rather small in absolute terms,
 
and as such, its ability to hinder the development of any
 
region remains highly questionable. By the same token the
 
amount of FBI also tends to negate the claim by the Turkish
 
left, that it is a tool of Neo-Colonialism. As previously
 
stated, to simply accuse the MNCs of hindering the devel­
^^Soysal (1969-70) p.26. Industries' have clearly
 
shown a preference for the Thracian-Marmara-Aegean area.
 
Soysal has found that 45% of all manufacturing industries
 
are located in Istanbul and account for 48% of the total
 
net value added.
 
20weiker (1981) p.211.
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optnent of the country as a whole is an over simplification
 
of a complex issuey ; Other factors need to be; taken ;
 
consideration in the analysis.
 
In ofder to assure an even regipnal deyelopmerit in
 
the industrialization of Turkey, SEEs were geographically
 
dispersed. The high rdtes of inefficiency and the astro- ,
 
nomical costs involved in their operations, due to their
 
seeming isolation from any linkage between other industries,
 
are some of the factors that have prevented - the regional
 
development of the country. ; In addition, Turkey's inability
 
to industrialize has also been attributed to its high
 
dependence on foreign countries for its intermediate mate
 
rials. This not only prevented Turkey from establishing
 
an infrastructure, but it also detracted from any impetus
 
to create one. Furthermore, it hindered its ability to
 
control prices as they were a function of the costs of im-

Hence, despite the claims by the Turkish Ml-TC critics,
 
the impact of MNCs on the Turkish economy is far from con- ;
 
elusive. As we have seen foreign investment has not had
 
a dominant role in the Turkish economy, and has mostly been
 
limited to the manufacturing sector. In comparison to its
 
Turkish counterparts, foreign industries have proven to be
 
more efficient and productive. As a result of the role of
 
local industries, it is difficult to determine the extent
 
of the impact, negative or positive, that MNCs have had on
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Turkey's economy. The claim that MNCs hinder the devel
 
opment of rural Turkey, is far too simplistic.
 
Like so many LDCs, Turkey's quest for rapid indus
 
trialization, was not only economically desxrable, but
 
politically imperative. The agricultural sector's ability
 
to absorb the labor surplus of a rapidly expanding popu
 
lation is clearly limited. This problem is further mag
 
nified since over 60 percent of Turkey's population is
 
rural. As such, an outlet for the growing labor force had
 
to be created.21 The industrialization of the country
 
appeared to be the solution; not only would it absorb the
 
increased labor force, but it was also concomitant with
 
Turkey's desire to move away from an agriculture economy.
 
The problem with this process was the urge to accomplish
 
it overnight. If one were to speculate, one could conclude
 
that it was the hopes of the GOT that establishing heavy
 
industries in the rural regions would generate further in
 
dustrial development. The meager transportation networks
 
in much of the rural area, along with the lack of satis
 
factory communication, electriGal., and water faqilities
 
proved to be strong deterrents to the founding of new
 
industries.
 
21with a rate of population growth of 2.5/o per _ annum,
 
it has been estimated that by the year 2000 Turk^ will
 
have a population of 60 million. The GQT will have to
 
play a significant role in reducing the growth rate.
 
&2
 
Under the notion of the mixed economy, the govern
 
ment was to invest in ventures that were necessary to create
 
a solid infrastructure. As a means of developing the couhtry
 
the theoretical model of a mixed economy merits attentioh,
 
and could be implemented by Third World countries with sim
 
ilar barriers to development. One of the problems with the
 
mixed economy, however, is when the government begins to
 
view the model as a tool td advance its own interest, the
 
initial objectives become blurred and eventually lost. It
 
must be recalled that Ataturk had viewed the mixed economy
 
as a means of promoting development while simultaneously
 
strengthening the private sector. The monopolizing of
 
various industries such as steel and oil, clearly deviates
 
from the goals of the mixed economy. 22 Because the SEEs
 
enjoye-d a monopoly and government subsidies, the goals of
 
productivity and efficiency, associated with most competi­
^^The emergence of the armed forces as entrepreneurs
 
further violates the principles of the mixed economy. In
 
January 1961, the passing of the Law of the Army Mutual
 
Assistance Association set up what soon became one of the
 
largest Gonglomerates in Turkey--the Ordu Yardimlasma
 
Kurumu (OYAK). OYAK generates its capital by requiring
 
that all officers invest 10% of their saldry into the
 
conglomerate. This allowed the army to invest in the most
 
profitable branches of the economy. According to Ahmad,^
 
OYAK has gained controlling interests in Turkish Automotive
 
Industry; MAT (a truck and tractor sales firm); the OYAK
 
insurance cpmpany; has 42% of the shares of OYAK-Renault,
 
to name a few. While OYAK began with a capital of about
 $3.5 million, its 1972 assets were estimated at $300
 
million. This clearly adds a new dimension to the polit
 
ical economy of the military coups.
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tive industries, were nonexistent. This prevented the . ■ 
accumulation of capital, a.n absolute prerequisite for growth. 
The loose management of the SEEs is not the sole reason for 
poor performance. A great portion of the costs stem from 
the SEEs location in rural areas devoted to agriculture, and 
lacking in regional comparative advantage for the develop 
ment of industries.23 it could be argued that if Turkey is 
to achieve equitable development it must concentrate ou the 
particular regions'natural comparative advantage, Develop 
ment, it must be realized, is not limited to industrializa­
tion, but encompasses other sectors such as agriculture, 
rearing of livestock, and forestry as well. This does not 
imply that Turkey should ignore its industrial capabilities, 
but that it should be more selective in its locations; and
 
in areas not conducive to industries, the development of
 
alternative sectors should be explored.
 
The Role of M^JCs Under The
 
New Economic Policies :
 
The Turkish government is presently seeking foreign
 
23The term 'regional comparative advantage' follows
 
the same principal as the Ricardian model, but is used in
 
reference to the domestic rather than the international
 
level. ■ ■ . ■ . 
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investments in the agroindustrial sector.24 The GOT aims
 
at combining the processing facilities with contract farming
 
with the rural population. The export of poultry, fruits,
 
vegetables, beef and mutton to the Arabian Peninsula is
 
being heavily encouraged. This, however, requires more
 
elaborate processing and packaging operations than presently
 
available, and the foreign firms are expected to play a
 
vital role in providing capital and expertise. The com
 
bining of contract farming with foreign industries involved
 
in the processing and packaging of the goods, while bene
 
fiting the economy also avoids the displacing of the rural
 
population common with large scale agroindustrial projects.
 
Foreign investment is also allov7ed in cattle raising and
 
integrated animal husbandry. This is an attempt by the GOT.
 
to improve on the breeds and to take advantage of an un­
exploited market.
 
While having increased the emphasis in the agri
 
cultural sector, the GOT is continuing its attention to the
 
manufacturing, oil, and mining sectors. In these areas,
 
MNCs are encouraged to participate in joint ventures with
 
Turkish industries. Foreign private investment in these
 
fields is attractive to the Turkish government as, in
 
24The term 'agroindustry' follows Austin's defi
 
nition in which he describes it as; "an enterprise that
 
processes agricultural raw materials including ground and
 
tree crops as well as livestock". This involves the entire
 
process from seed or pasture to the consumer.
 
addition to providing expertise and capital, it shares the
 
risks and costs. With the MNCs providing a share of the
 
capital, the burden on the national debt is eased as the
 
government would otherwise be compelled to borrow the nec
 
essary funds. As an incentive for oil exploration, the GOT
 
has lifted the artificially set price of $5.21 a barrel and
 
has brought it closer to that of the world level. In addi
 
tion, 35 percent of any find may be exported. Further
 
incentives in the like of tax rebates, tax holidays, custom
 
exemption for material required for investment, are used as
 
a means of enticing foreign investment.
 
The only sector in which Turkey allows foreign
 
investors to hold 100 percent of the investment is in tour
 
ism, provided that they construct hotels with a minimum
 
capacity of 400 beds; or in the case of yacht tourism, a
 
minimum of 60 beds. Despite having 8,370 kilometers of
 
Mediterranean coastline scattered with the relics of
 
ancient civilization, Turkey's tourist industry has left
 
much to be desired. Part of this is attributed to the lack
 
of accomodations. At the end of 1979, the number of hotel
 
beds was 47,000.25 While the Turkish government is investing
 
in new roads and an international airport at Dalaman, in
 
south-west Turkey, they are counting on foreign investors
 
25The Economist 12, 18 September, 1981. For a basis
 
of comparison: Greece's total was 266,000, and Spain's
 
977,000. ^
 
66 
to build facilities that would meet the rich European stan
 
dards and tastes. The potential of the tourist industry is
 
highlighted by the fact that foreign investors are allowed
 
to own the entire operation.
 
As can be seen, Turkey is a prime example of a
 
country able to attract foreign investment on its own
 
terms.26 in the past, Turkey has attempted to develop a
 
strong private economy, but was hampered by the scarcity of
 
capital and the lack of technological resources. The present
 
policies are an attempt to overcome these barriers without
 
compromising the country's quest for development or its
 
sovereignty over the national economy. The increased MNG
 
competition should prove advantageous for Turkey's foreign
 
investment. While the Turkish radical left claims that if
 
the economic benefits are weighed in favor of Turkey,foreign
 
firms would, under these conditions never agree to enter;
 
the investment of $100 million on the part of foreign firms
 
in the eighteen months following the reforms along with the
 
increase in applications for entry tend to negate this claim
 
26i5^ the eighteen months following the reforms Turkey
 
has had a net new foreign investment of $100 million.
 
Though at first sight this does not appear to be a sub-_
 
stantial amount, when compared to previous investments it
 
is rather sizeable. Furthermore, in light of the economic
 
and political condition that Turkey was in, this sum takes
 
on greater significance and coupled with the increase in
 
applications for entry, marks,in my opinion, the future trend
 
of foreign investment.
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and supports the contention that MNCs will opt to forsake
 
a portion of their profits rather than the entire market.
 
Also, the higher rates of productivity and efficiency asso
 
ciated with fpreigh firms, along with their eapital and
 
their expertise makes them attraetive to Turkey's attempt
 
to strengthen its economy. This in turn, dictates that the
 
MNCs be assured economic benefits so as to continue invest
 
ments in the couhtry. For the most part the incentives that
 
are offered foreign firms are indicative of their potential
 
contribution to the country, and the extent of the MNC
 
competition in that particular field. This is well illus
 
trated in the Turkish case. This quid pro quo relationship
 
between MNCs and Turkey could prove to be the foundation of
 
the growth and, provided its correct application, the even
 
tual development of the country.
 
1 Summary and Conclusion
 
Foreign direct investment has not had a substantial
 
role in the development of the Turkish economy. This is,
 
in part, due to the fact that Turkey sought to be self-

sufficient and independent of foreign investors. The lack ;
 
of capital, managerial and technological skills prompted
 
Turkey to liberalize its policies towards MNCs in 1954.
 
However, up to 1980, the distrust of foreigners prevailed,
 
and entry by MNCs remained limited. It was not until the
 
new economic policies of January 1980 that the GOT began to
 
actively court foreign enterprises. Given the recentness 
of these policfes,,: ttie impact of MNCs cannot be determined 
as-;of yet^V;, V ■ 
The specific entry fequirements as forwarded by the
 
GOT along with the increase in applications for entry rights
 
suggest that Turkey will be able to take advantage of the
 
benefits assbciated with FDI while maintaining strict control
 
over its ecbnomic development plans•
 
Chapter 6
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 
As the review of literature has shown, the conclu
 
sions on the impact of multinational corporations on the
 
developing world are far from copgehial. Though the theoret
 
ical approach of the Neo-Classical school is conducive to
 
growth, its application has failed to meet the theoretical
 
objectives. It is therefore importarit to look,at the alter
 
native schools in an attempt to evaluate the performance of
 
the orthodox model, and to objectively analyze the reasons 
for which the full implementatioh of the■Neb-Classical model 
has not met with expectations. This task is simplified when 
the alternative schools are viewed as resulting from the 
dissatisfaction with the application of the orthodox model, 
and as forwarding their respective analyses and conclusions. 
The major limitation to these approaches is the aggregate 
analysis of the impact of Mtrcs which tends to ignore the 
specific circumstances surrounding the host country, as v^ell 
as its particular relationships with the MNCs within its 
borders. As such, any single approach cannot be used as a 
blanket analysis of the impact of MNCs in a particular coun 
try. The impact of each MNC on a host country must be 
analyzed on an individual basis. 
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It appears as axiomatic that the development of a
 
country must be based on a solid infrastructure conducive
 
to the continued growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
 
Without a solid foundation and increases in the GDP concom
 
itant with the increase in population, development will
 
remain a distant goal. Though economic growth is not a
 
sufficient factor to ensure development, it is an absolute
 
prerequisite. Prior to the 1980 reforms, Turkey applied
 
cosmetic remedies in its quest for development. That is,
 
it encouraged the process of industrialization through im
 
port substitution, thereby giving the appearance of modern
 
ization, but without achieving development. During this
 
process the development of a Solid foundation was largely
 
neglected. The new policies are an attempt to overcome
 
some of the past problems. The principal job of the public
 
sector will be to concentrate on its original role of
 
developing an infrastructure. Specifically, the focus will
 
be on ehergy, transport, irrigation, and agricultural in
 
vestments.
 
A notion which Turkey has also come to reevaluate
 
is that of self-sufficiency as a means of eliminating any
 
reliance on foreign countries. This orientation has been,
 
it can be argued, based on false premises. That is, the
 
assumption that self-sufficiency implies a total indepen
 
dence from outside forces, and the ability to locally
 
produce all of the country's needs. The integration of the
 
world market has been generated by the impossibility of such
 
a task which presupposes the availability and abundance of
 
all resources. Rather, it must be argued, that self-

sufficiency should signify a country's ability to pursue its
 
quesb for development by relying bhitao^f^ of pro
 
duction for integration in the world market.
 
With regard to MNCs being agents of development, the
 
following argument should be considered. The term develop
 
ment has been too losely used and often interchangeably with
 
growth. This has resulted with many LDCs being satisfied
 
with an increase in the growth rates, while neglecting the
 
more involved and complicated process of development. Along
 
the same line, there have been debates over whether multi
 
national corporations are agents of deve1opment. It seems
 
evident that they are not, nor can they be agents of devel
 
opment. Development is neither within the objectives or
 
the abilities of MNCs. Their role in the economic development
 
of the Third World can only be limited to agents of growth.
 
MNCs can contribute to the host country's develop
 
ment plans by providing capital and expertise--managerial
 
and technological--as well as through the inter-corporate
 
links. Their accessibility to the world market is a great
 
asset in promoting exports and adding to the host country's
 
foreign exchange reserves. Of course, this is not always
 
the case, but it is the responsibility of the host govern
 
ment to assure MNC compliance. The current inter-MNC
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competition along with the LDCs' better understanding of
 
the operation of MNCs will lead to this end.
 
It must be recalled that this study assumed that the
 
host government has the best interesf of the country in mind.
 
As such, this study did not focus on possible cpllusion
 
between the governing elite and the MNCs. This thesis mere
 
ly sought to see whether a host country, whose government
 
is responsive to its constituents, can effectively use MNCs
 
as a means to enhance development efforts.
 
In their attempts to harness the MNCs, many host
 
countries have implemented various means of control. One
 
of the most common has been the requirement of joint venture-

ships. To assume, however, that varying proportions of
 
ownership assures control over the MNCs, tends to overlook
 
the modus operandi of MNCs, and further assumes that they
 
will be drastically altered according to ownership and
 
nationality. Given the recent trend that MNCs are unlikely
 
to impose self-restraint on the basis of national loyalty,
 
joint ownership as a means of control may be ineffective.
 
Studies have found that in joint ventures local investors
 
frequently place more emphasis on declaring dividends and
 
less on the reinvestment of earnings. As a result, though
 
foreign investors are less successful in deferring tax
 
pajnnents, it does not appear that the amount of repatriated
 
profits are drastically affected by joint ventures. As this
 
study has argued, it will be the new found power of selectivity
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which will allow the host countries to assure that the oper
 
ation of MNCs is compleiuentary to their overall development
 
plans. The recent rise in European and Third World multi­
national corporations marks the heginning of a new^e in
 
international trade, and is part of the dialectical process
 
leading to a better and more equitable world.
 
With regards to the question of whether MNCs are a
 
mean of enhancing Turkey's development, a conclusive answer
 
cannot be made at this time. This is mainly the result of
 
the limited involvement of MNCs in Turkey. While MNCs have
 
negatively affected certain aspects of the Turkish economy,
 
they have benefited others.
 
In the long run, the increase in MNC competition
 
along with the LDCs' better understanding of the operation
 
Of MNCs should allow host govemments to capture a larger
 
share of the benefits in their dealings with MI^Cs, the prop
 
er use of which would greatly facilitate the task pf
 
economic development. Rather than being viewed as s threat,
 
MNCs will hopefully serve as a bridge between the developed
 
and the less developed worlds.
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Appendix B
 
Hacroeconomic Targets and Acliievements of the Development
 
Plans. 
1st 1963­ 2nd 1968­ 3rd: : 1973­
Plan Plan 1972 Plan 1977 
Target ActuaT Target Target Actual 
Sectoral■Growth Rates 
4.2 3.7 4.1 3.6 3.7 3.3 
Industry 
Services 
GDP 
GNP 
12.3 
6.2 
6.9 
7.0 
10.6 
, 7.5 
6.5 
6.7 
12.0 
6.3 
6.6 
7.0 
9.9 
7.7 
6.6 
7.1 
11.4 
6.8 
7.6 
7.4 
9.9 
7.9 
6.5 
6.5 
Fixed Investment 
Sectoral Distribution 
Mining
Manufacturing 
Tourism 
Housing 
Education 
Health 
Other Services 
17.7 
5.4 
16.9 
8.6 
13.7 
1.4 
20.3 
7.1 
2.3 
6.6 
13.9 
5.6 
20.4 
6.5 
15.6 
1.3 
22.4 
6.6 
1.8 
5.9 
15.2 
3.7 
22.4 
8.0 
16.1 
2.3 
17.9 
6.7 
1.8 
5.9 
: 
11.1 
3.3 
26.8 
9.0 
16.0 
2.1 
20.1 
4.7 
1.4 
5.4 
11.7 
5.8 
31.1 
8.5 
14.5 
1.6 
15.7 
5.0 
1.4 
4.7 
11.8 
3.7 
28.2 
7.4 
20.6 
1.0 
16.9 
3.3 
1.1 
6.0 
Total lOUTU lOOTO 10770 10077 10777 100.0 
Ownership (7 
Public 
Private 
59 .9 
40.1 
53.6 
46.4 
52.6 
: 47.4 
52.9 
47.1 
56.4 
43.6 
51.1 
48.9 
Total 100.0 1^^ lUoTO lUOTO 10770 10777 
As 7o of GNP 18.3 15.3 21.3 17. 8 23.4 20.2 
(average in Plan period) 
Consumption Growth {% 
Public 
Private 
8 .7 
5.4 ; 
7.7 
4.8 
8.8 
5.1 
12. 3 
5.5 
8.9 
4.8 
10.4 
6.2 
Total TTT "57T "57? 6.6 "577 
"O" 
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Appendix B 
1st 1963- 2nd 1968- 3rd 1973­
Plan 1967 Plan 1972 Plan 1977 
Target Actual Target Actual Target Actual 
National Savings 
Annual Growth 
(%) 
As 7o of GNP 
13.4 
14.8 _ 
/ 
16.2 
15.7 
12.2 
20.8 
^ 9.1 
18.3 
13.6 
21.9 
6.3 
19.9 
(average in Plan period)
 
Source: Weiker p.185; As cited in TUSIDA, "The Turkish Econ
 
omy", p.101.
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Appendix G
 
1923
 
1929
 
1930
 
1946
 
1954
 
1960
 
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
 
Izmir Econmic Conference establishes that
 
the principal economic goal of the coxintty
 
would be the industrialization of the
 
economy.
 
World depression brings an end to the res
 
trictive provisions in the 1923 Treaty of
 
Lausanne. Signed between the Turkish
 
government and the Allied Powers, the treaty,
 
among other stipulations required that the
 
GOT not impose higher tariffs than those
 
effective in 1916. This clause had hampered
 
Turkey to protect its infant industries from
 
foreign competition.
 
Turkey reappraises its economic policies, and
 
emerges with a new economic model--a mixed
 
economy.
 
The founding of the Democratic Party (DP)
 
marks the end of the monoparty system
 
established by Ataturk.
 
Turkey accepts US foreign aid under the
 
Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. ^ As
 
it marks the beginning of Turko-US alliance
 
it also constitutes a basic theoretical
 
shift in Turkey's approach to etatism-­
the policy of state enterprise and control.
 
January 18, the Law for the Encouragement
 
of Foreign Capital is enacted. Though the
 
law was geared towards attracting FDI, the ; ;
 
distrust of foreigners by government offi­
cials prevented the full implementation of
 
the laws liberal policies.
 
The military overthrows the DP headed by_
 
Adnan Menderes on May 27, due to the admin
 
istrations failure to preserve Kemalist
 
The State Planning Organization (SPG) is
 
created, marking the imp1ementation of eco
 
nomic planning. The economic targets were
 
made on a five year plan basis. They are
 
now in the fourth.
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1-961
 
1961-62
 
1971
 
1950-77
 
1977
 
1978
 
1980
 
■In January, the passing of the Law of the 
Army Mutual Assistance Association set up
what was to become one of Turkey's largest
conglomerates--the Ordu Yardimlasma Kurumu 
<OYAK) 
A new constitution is approved by refe 
rendum, providing a strong executive. 
Following prolonged political and economic 
unrest, the armed forces demand the 
resignation of Demirel. 
Turkey experiences an average annual growth 
rate of 6.5%, the highest among the OECD 
countries. Real growth, however, is dimi 
nished by an annual population growth rate 
of 2.5%. 
Following a defeat in a vote of confidence,
Ecevit is replaced by Demirel. A total of 
262 people die in continuous political
violence. Serious economic problems are 
manifested. 
The death toll from the recurrent political
violence reaches nearly 290 by early August,
surpassing the total of 1977. 
The Justice Party headed by Demirel returns 
to power following Ecevit's resignation in 
November. The Justice Party inherits a 
nearly bankrupt economy. Turkey is unable 
to service its foreign debts, inflation nears 
120%, the money supply increased by 150% 
in less than two yeats, and unemplojnuent 
reaches 25%. 
January 24, Turkey adopts a new outward-
oriented economic policy.
January 25, Decree No. 8/168 amends the Law 
for the Encouragement of Foreign Capital and 
further liberalizes it. 
September 12, as a result of social unrest 
and political violence the military takes 
over the reigns of government. Turgut Ozal, 
the author of the new economic program is 
promoted to the post of deputy prime minister 
for economic affairs. 
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1981 
 Eighteen months after the implementation
 
of the economic reforms inflation is
 
reduced from a high of 1337o to under
 
35%. After 3 years of zero or negative

growth, Turkey records a growth rate of
 
4.47o for the year.
 
1982 
 Turkey continues its economic recovery.
 
Its successes over the past 2 years,
 
surprises even the IMF.
 
